Universal Moral Grammar in The New York Times

 

In this week's New York Times Book Review, Richard Rorty reviews Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong, by the Harvard psychologist, Marc Hauser.  Rorty’s review is negative; he thinks Hauser’s “exuberant triumphalism” is undeserved.  However, while Rorty raises some important issues, he does not really do justice to Hauser’s book or the evidence on which it relies.

Hauser’s book is based on an analogy between morality and language.  His aim is to describe a research program in moral psychology based on Noam Chomsky’s theory of Universal Grammar. (This is a concept near and dear to my heart; Chomsky’s own latest thoughts on the analogy may be found here.)  But Hauser’s book does more than this: it also provides an excellent general introduction to the psychology and biology of morality, a rapidly expanding field of investigation with far-reaching implications for law and legal theory.  Many of the book’s main ideas and much of its historical scholarship derive from my PhD thesis on Rawls’ linguistic analogy (and these debts are not always adequately noted, unfortunately).  But Hauser also surveys virtually the entire range of relevant scientific literature, including philosophy, economics, anthropology, linguistics, cognitive science, primatology, evolutionary biology, and neuroscience.  For example, he discusses some brilliant work by an exciting new generation of experimental philosophers and cognitive scientists, including James Blair, Joshua Greene, Jonathan Haidt, Joshua Knobe, Jorge Moll, Shaun Nichols, and Jesse Prinz.  Additionally, he draws from his own Internet-based investigations of moral judgment, including a forthcoming study of trolley problem intuitions involving several thousand subjects from 120 countries.  (Previous research in the same vein may be found here, here, and here.)  And Hauser ties all of this research together with evidence from non-human animal studies, along with child development, functional imaging, and clinical investigations.  All told, the book is a valuable achievement, a lucid synthesis of the current state of play in a field that is starting to come into its own.

Comments

[Dean C. Rowan]

Having read Rorty's review--but not the subject of the review--I want to note that this post seems to misrepresent Rorty. He doesn't argue that Hauser fails to survey sufficient experimental results. "The vast bulk of Moral Minds consists of reports of experimental results," he writes, "but Hauser does very little to make clear how these results bear on his claim that there is a 'moral voice of our species.'" Seems to me the criticism is that Hauser fails to make a clean argument, to "tie[] all of this research together," as this post asserts in contradiction. That's the gist of Rorty's point, I think, and from there I'll extrapolate and suggest he intends a broader related concern. The cultural aspect of the sciences--the way their achievements are reflected in media and popular literature like Hauser's book--promotes a kind of "exuberant triumphalism," hubris. It's that cultural aspect that turns an utterly mundane--pardon the pun--scientific activity, such as reclassifying the planetary status of a celestial body, into a controversy--granted, a middling one--over the arbitrary power wielded by scientists.

[Brian Leiter]

In addition to the points noted by Mr. Rowan, it seems to me you need to respond to the most serious charge Rorty makes against the proposed analogy between Chomsky's argument for universal grammar and the argument for an innate moral sense: "the analogy seems fragile. Chomsky has argued, powerfully if not conclusively, that simple trial-and-error imitation of adult speakers cannot explain the speed and confidence with which children learn to talk: some special, dedicated mechanism must be at work. But is a parallel argument available to Hauser? For one thing, moral codes are not assimilated with any special rapidity. For another, the grammaticality of a sentence is rarely a matter of doubt or controversy, whereas moral dilemmas pull us in opposite directions and leave us uncertain. (Is it O.K. to kill a perfectly healthy but morally despicable person if her harvested organs would save the lives of five admirable people who need transplants? Ten people? Dozens?)" For these, and other reasons, the analogy seems quite incredible.

[Brian Leiter is Wrong]

1. For one thing, moral codes are not assimilated with any special rapidity.

"Special rapidity" relative to what? Certainly especially rapid in contradistinction to lower forms of animals; certainly especially rapid in contradistinction to understanding of advanced calculus.

2. For another, the grammaticality of a sentence is rarely a matter of doubt or controversy, whereas moral dilemmas pull us in opposite directions and leave us uncertain.

Do moral dilemmas leave us uncertain? If that were true, they wouldn't be dilemmas. Dilemmas pull us in exactly two directions and we certainly can pick one side, as many do. In fact, moral dilemmas are useful precisely as learning tools because they enable people to choose what they want to believe. Moral dilemmas often lead to people picking sides and staying there.

3. (Is it O.K. to kill a perfectly healthy but morally despicable person if her harvested organs would save the lives of five admirable people who need transplants? Ten people? Dozens?)

This is an argument that is impressive only for its vagueness. Vagueness is not the same thing as a "dilemma" -- how admirable is admirable; how despeciable is despicable? We can't make the calculation Rorty is inviting us to without a sense of what we are calculating. We need facts; Rorty's argument does not prove the calculation cannot be made; only that it cannot be made if one formulates the question so vaguely.

4. Brian Leiter: For these, and other reasons, the analogy seems quite incredible.

Given that "these" reasons are suspect, what are the "other reasons" that cast doubt on Hauser's analogy?

[Brian Leiter]

1. Rapidity relative to the acquisition of grammatical competence, obviously.

2. This makes no sense as a reply. The point is that judgments of grammaticality are rarely controversial, while judgments of morality often are.

3. Another irrelevant ramble. One might deny that there are ever moral dilemmas, but I doubt Mikhail or anyone else wants to take that route by way of response.

John, if you do end up pullying the last ignorant reply, you can pull my comments here as well. I look forward to hearing your thoughts.

[Brian Leiter is, Like, Even Wronger]

Brian Leiter's Nonsense on Stilts: The point is that judgments of grammaticality are rarely controversial, while judgments of morality often are.

If "judgments of grammaticality are rarely controversial," then that helps to explain why English professors and philosophers of language never disagree. If "judgments of morality are often controversial," then that helps to explain the polarized debate amongst Holocaust survivors over the merits of the Final Solution.

[MD]

The materialists grope towards a universal moral sense. Who would have thought?

[Eh Nonymous]

Brian Leiter is even wronger is, like, a troll. So that's cute and all.

But without taking to task his (it's probably a man; do women ever write anything as foolishly as this troll?) young (can you imagine anyone living past 35 with a mindset like this? ) idiocy,

BLILEW makes an interesting and provocative, if obviously wrong, point.

To compare the disagreements between serious students of language (like Chomsky, say) of what is grammatical and what is not - say, based on evidence? - to the disagreements over what is moral and what is not... well, is that a fair comparison?

Have there ever been holy wars over whether dangling participles are appropriate? Yes, the fighting is bloodiest when the stakes are low.

But no, your analogy is stupid and wrong. :)

HAND, HTH.

[Rachel Halberstrom]

Order of magnitude, e.g., waging wars instead of refusing to shake hands, is not the same as frequency, e.g., bickering with your spouse everyday. Brian Leiter only spoke to frequency, so BLILEW's comments aren't "obviously wrong" in the least. And your ad hominem attacks are about as credible as your cowardly desire to remain anonymous, which is all too male, all too young, and all so predictably pathetic.

[Eric Thomson]

I would be surprised if the poverty of the stimulus argument worked for the moral sphere.

The most important question for the 'rapidity' of acquiring values is whether there is enough moral information in the environment to learn (via statistical inference or some such) the (putative) set of internal moral rules and representaitons.